We propose a duopoly model of competition between internet search engines endowed with di¤erent technologies and study the e¤ects of an agreement where the more advanced …rm shares its technology with the inferior one. We show that the superior …rm enters the agreement only if it results in a large enough increase in demand for advertising space at the competing …rm and a relatively small improvement of the competitor's search quality.
Introduction
Few other markets have experienced such a dramatic growth during the last decade as internet search. The …rst search engines appeared in the early nineties as small enterprises and were only used by a narrow circle of users. By contrast, the search engine Google alone handled around 20 million searches per day in 2000 (Google, 2000) . In 2009 this …gure amounted to near 200 million in the U.S. alone. 1 Within a few years, Google, the company that emerged to be the leader in online search and advertising reached a market capital of $102 billion in 2009. 2 The rise of internet search went hand-in-hand with a boom in online advertising. While in 1998 internet advertising revenues were around $2 billion in the United States, in 2008 they totalled over $22 billion (PwC, 2008) . A large share of this type of advertising is provided by search engines: between 2004 and 2008 search based advertising revenues accounted for around 40 percent of internet advertising revenues (PwC, 2008) .
Search engines deliver search results to keywords given by users. At the same time they display advertisements next to the search results. These are paid links for a particular keyword bought by advertisers who wish to direct users from the search engine's results page to their own web pages. Search engines typically provide search service free of charge for users while charging advertisers for displaying their links next to the search results. Payments from the advertisers constitute the main source of revenues for the search engines.
Search engines face a twofold task: First, they need to maintain access to the available content in the internet. Second, they must be able to match the most relevant content to the users'search queries. Every search engine uses a particular ranking algorithm which determines the relevance of a certain web page to a user's query. These algorithms calculate the overall relevance of a retrieved web page based on several factors, such as the number and importance of links pointing to the page and the frequency as well as the environment of the keywords' occurrence at the page. The search results generated by such an algorithm are called organic results. Since the ranking algorithms are optimized so as to retrieve the most relevant web pages for a keyword combination, we regard organic results as the best match to the user's query.
They are typically displayed on the left side of the search results page. Advertisements (so called sponsored links) are usually displayed next to the organic results on the top and on the right side of the page.
Search engines are two-sided businesses. They operate as platforms connecting users with advertisers. Advertisers aim to reach a possibly large audience with their advertisements and value a search engine with a larger user base more. On the other hand, users prefer to see either better matching advertisements or as few of them as possible as such sponsored links may bring distortion into the organic search results and reduce the overall quality of search. At the same time users value the design of a search engine's homepage and the additional services that can be quickly reached from it, such as email, maps, etc. The task search engines face is to choose the number of sponsored links and the level of di¤erentiation in a way that attracts users and advertisers in a pro…t-maximizing manner.
The last years have seen a strong concentration trend in the search engine market. Google emerged as the leading …rm with a share of searches above 60 percent in the U.S. and even higher in Europe (AdvertisingAge, 2008) . In the recent years Google has been continuously in the focus of antitrust authorities in the U.S. and Europe due to its participation in a number of transactions, such as its acquisition of YouTube and DoubleClick. The most recent arrangement raising the attention of competition agencies was Google's planned cooperation with its closest competitor Yahoo in 2008.
In June 2008 Google and Yahoo announced plans for an agreement to cooperate in advertising. The planned partnership would have let Yahoo use Google's technology to match advertisements with search keywords in Canada and the U.S. The proposed cooperation attracted antitrust scrutiny in several jurisdictions. The U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) opened a formal investigation of the deal in July, and the Canadian Competition Bureau launched a review of the plans in August. Although the scope of the planned agreement was formally limited to Canada and the U.S., the European Commission also started a preliminary investigation into the potential e¤ects of the deal. In November the DoJ announced that it would …le suit to block the arrangement between Yahoo and Google. On the same day, the parties o¢ cially abandoned the agreement. The DoJ justi…ed its approach by claiming that the deal would have virtually eliminated Yahoo as a competitor in the advertising market, and outsourcing advertisements to Google would have signi…cantly reduced Yahoo's incentives to invest in search advertising technology (DoJ, 2008) .
It is widely accepted that Google possesses a superior technology for matching advertisements with search keywords and is able to place more relevant advertisements to queries. Sharing this technology with its competitor, Google would improve the quality of services provided by Yahoo.
We distinguish between two e¤ects this may have. First, making a superior technology available to Yahoo could have an e¤ect on the advertisers' willingness to pay for advertisement space through the increased probability of a successful sale of the advertised good. Second, the users could bene…t from increased search quality as Yahoo displayed more relevant advertisements on the search results page.
In the present paper we propose a model that takes into account the most important characteristics of the internet search market. In our model two horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated search engine operators compete with each other. They provide search results to users and sell advertising space to advertisers. Advertisers aim to reach a possibly large audience while users prefer more relevant search results. Advertising has a dual role: on the one hand it is informative, making users value better matched advertisements more. On the other hand, advertising is a nuisance to users since more advertisements bring distortion into the organic search results.
We take one …rm to be endowed with a more advanced technology to match search queries with advertisements. This allows it to provide more relevant search results for users and to charge higher prices for its advertisement slots. We examine two research questions. First, we analyze what motivates the operator of a superior search engine to strengthen its competitor through providing it with a more advanced technology. Second, we address the welfare implications of such a cooperation agreement for advertisers and users. We conclude that the superior search engine will enter the agreement only if it results in a relatively large increase in demand from advertisers and a relatively small improvement of the competitor's search quality. Although the superior search engine gains market share the deal is bene…cial for the inferior …rm. If the deal takes place, it is in line with the advertisers'interest but it is detrimental to users'welfare.
Our work can be placed into the broader context of three distinct strands of literature. First, it contributes to the emerging literature on two-sided markets, focusing on platform businesses 4 that facilitate transaction between distinct groups of consumers in the presence of indirect network e¤ects. Second, it …ts into the literature related to advertising-supported media, which tends to present advertising as a nuisance for the consumers. Third, it adds to the literature on the economics of internet search engines.
In two-sided markets, platforms intermediate between two sets of agents, such that the participation of one group in ‡uences the value of participating for the other group. The seminal papers of Armstrong (2006) and Rochet and Tirole (2003) provide overviews on the economics of multi-sided platforms. Armstrong (2006) focuses on the case of positive externalities arising on both sides of the market. He shows that a platform sets prices on each side of the market in a way that the group generating larger network externalities or the one with more elastic demand will be subsidized by the other group. Rochet and Tirole (2003) show a similar pattern of cross-subsidization of the two sides. Reisinger (2004) models competing platforms in a setting where one side exerts a negative externality on the other side. Evans and Schmalensee (2007) address competition policy issues arising in a two-sided environment.
Our work is closely related to the literature on advertising-supported media (see Bagwell, 2007 for a survey). In this strand, Anderson and Coate (2005) provide a seminal contribution to the literature on platform competition for advertisers. In their model of competition between
two TV channels, they analyze how these platforms di¤er in terms of the levels of advertising and program choice. They …nd that both equilibrium advertising levels as well as program quality can be either too high or too low, depending on parameter values. Gal-Or and Dukes (2006) analyze the conditions under which a non-consolidating merger between two TV or radio stations can be pro…table. In their model consumers are averse to advertisement but may draw a positive utility from it as it informs them about prices. A merger between stations increases the level of advertising which decreases the advertisers'prices and pro…ts. This again decreases their willingness to pay for advertising which may render the stations'merger unpro…table.
Our work contributes to the relatively new strand of research focusing on the economics of internet search engines. Evans (2008) provides an extensive overview of the history and characteristics of the online advertising industry. A lot of the research dealing with the economics of search engines focuses on the auction mechanisms search engines use to sell advertisement space on their web sites. Work in this area includes e.g. Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) and Varian (2007) . Telang, Rajan and Mukhopaday (2004) focus on the organization of internet search engines while Pollock (2008) analyzes factors facilitating concentration in the search engine market and discusses possible regulatory interventions. White (2008) examines the search engine's incentives to provide quality to users and the tradeo¤ between generating revenues by directing users to paid links and providing high quality search results in order to attract users. Beschorner (2008) uses a model to review the latest series of deals involving Google including the planned cooperation agreement with Yahoo. He highlights the increased ability to provide customized services and content as a bene…t to be weighed o¤ against the increase in concentration which may result from these transactions. Our paper is motivated by the planned and abandoned cooperation agreement between Yahoo and Google in 2008 and is an application of the general two-sided market framework (Armstrong, 2006) to the internet search market. Regarding search engines as a form of advertising-supported media (Anderson and Coate, 2005) we investigate the incentives of a …rm possessing a superior technology to improve its competitor by sharing this technology with it. To our knowledge our paper is the …rst to provide conditions under which the high technology …rm is interested in strengthening its competitor in an environment similar to the search engine market and to make inference about the welfare e¤ects of such a cooperation.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we present the set-up of the model. In Section 3 we derive and characterize the equilibrium. In Section 4 we apply our framework to the analysis of the advertising cooperation between the search engines. Finally, Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We analyze a two-sided market in which two horizontally and vertically di¤erentiated search engine operators i = f1; 2g provide search results to users and sell advertising space to advertisers. We assume that …rm 1 possesses a superior technology to match advertisements to search queries and provides services of better quality to both users as well as advertisers. We will refer to …rm 1 as the superior and to …rm 2 as the inferior …rm. The search results are free for users, while advertisers pay price p i for an advertising slot at search engine i. Each search engine operator decides on the number of advertising slots it places on its web page, denoted by a i .
Search engines provide their services at zero marginal cost and realize pro…ts
We assume that users single-home, i.e. every user conducts search at only one search engine (see Evans, 2008) . We assume furthermore that the users' demand for the advertisers' goods is homogenous. It follows from these assumptions that the value of an advertisement placed at one search engine is independent of the value of an advertisement placed at the other, hence we have separate demand functions for advertisement slots at the two engines.
If an advertiser k places an advertisement of his product at search engine i, its expected pro…t E k i takes the form
where n i , p k and c k denote the number of users at search engine i, the price of …rm k's product and advertising costs respectively. We assume that every user buys exactly one unit of the good and normalize its price to unity (p k = 1). The advertising costs c k capture the …rms' …xed costs associated with placing an advertisement other than the price paid for advertising space, such as the costs for designing the advertisement, acquiring the necessary computer literacy, etc.
The advertisers are heterogeneous with respect to their costs which are uniformly distributed on the interval c k 2 [0; 1). Pr fSaleg denotes the probability that a user buys the product of advertiser k after having seen its advertisement on search engine i's result page. We assume that
Pr fSaleg = 1 i , where the parameter i captures search engine i's ability to match search queries with advertisements. The lower value i takes, the better the search engine is in this task. For example, i = 0 means that search engine i is able to convert all impressions into sales while i = 1=3 implies that only 2=3 of those who have seen an advertisement end up buying the product. The maximum willingness to pay for an advertisement slot at search engine i is then given by
With its superior technology …rm 1 can display more relevant advertisements which increases the probability of a successful sale by the advertiser. This translates into a higher willingness 7 to pay for an advertising slot by the advertisers. We assume that for the superior search engine 1 = 0, while 2 2 (0; 1) re ‡ects the inferior …rm's "handicap" in matching advertisements with keywords.
Users derive utility i q from conducting search at engine i with quality index q > 0. The term i q is higher if search results are matched better to queries. Search results include both organic results as well as advertisements. We allow users to derive utility from better matched advertisements since ads can be informative for users. We assume that the quality of the search results is higher at engine 1 and normalize 1 to 1 while 2 2 (0; 1). With 2 < 1 the engines are vertically di¤erentiated. For notational simplicity in the following we will write and instead of 2 and 2 respectively. Let denote the quality advantage of …rm 1, with
, …rm 1 has no quality advantage compared to …rm 2, while > 0 means that …rm 1 has some quality advantage. We assume that the superior …rm's quality advantage lies in the range 2 ; with = =[4(1 + )(1 + (1 ))] and
We will analyze this restriction in more detail in the next section.
The assumption that one …rm is able to provide better matched search results for users and a higher probability of sale of the advertised products is realistic. It is widely accepted that
Google has a more advanced technology than its closest competitor Yahoo. The New York
Times notes that "Google makes 60 percent more revenue for each search than Yahoo because of its superior technology and larger market share, which attracts more advertisers to bid in Google's ad auctions." 3 Search engines di¤er in terms of the design of their home pages and the variety of extra services (such as email, maps, applications, etc.) they provide to users. It is reasonable to treat search engines as horizontally di¤erentiated. Speci…c features of a search engine's home page seem to play an important role in determining users choice which search engine to use. 4 The engines are placed on a unit circle such that the address of …rm 1 is normalized to s 1 = 0, the address of the other …rm is given by s 2 2 (0; 1). Users are uniformly distributed In our model advertisements (sponsored links) play a dual role. On the one hand they inform users of products they might be interested in, hence users bene…t from more relevant advertisements. On the other hand advertisements distort search results. Organic search results are determined by the search engine's ranking algorithm which takes into account a broad range of factors, including the clicking behavior of all users having conducted search before to predict which pages are the most relevant for a query. The order of organic results is the best predictor of a page's relevance according to the engine's ranking algorithm, hence sponsored links may distort the optimal ranking as they allow advertisers to "buy their place"at the top of the search result list. The users'disutility from advertisements depends on the number of ads and is given by a linear function a i with > 0.
The utility function of a user searching at engine i then takes the form
with 1 = minf(t s 1 ) ; (1 t s 1 )g and 2 = (t s 2 ) , where 2 i captures transportation costs. We assume that i q is high enough so that all users conduct search at one of the search engines.
In the following we restrict our attention to the case where the superior search engine serves more users than its competitor (n 1 > n 2 ). This assumption is realistic: Google is widely regarded to possess a more advanced technology to match queries with organic and sponsored links and has a signi…cantly larger market share than its competitors in most jurisdictions. 5 The timing of the game is as follows: First, search engine operator 2 decides on its location and both operators determine the number of advertisement slots at their web pages simultaneously. Second, users choose their preferred search engine and advertisers buy advertisement slots. We seek the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium and solve the game backwards. 9 users with addresses t 1 and t 2 who are indi¤erent between searching at the two engines:
t 2 (a 1 ; a 2 ; s 2 ) = (a 1 a 2 ) + 1 s 2 2 2(1 s 2 ) , with t 1 < t 2 . The market shares of the …rms are then n 1 = 1 t 1 + t 2 and n 2 = t 2 t 1 . This yields the following user demand at the search engines :
with @n i =@a i < 0 and @n i =@a j > 0 for i 6 = j. Plugging (5) into the right-hand side of (2) we get the demand for advertisement slots as a function of a 1 , a 2 and s 2 . The search engine operators maximize their pro…ts
by choosing the number of slots and …rm 2 chooses its position on the unit circle. In the following proposition we characterize the equilibrium in which both …rms serve users and …rm 1 has a larger user pool.
Proposition 1. The market situation in which both …rms serve users and …rm 1 has a larger market share of users is an equilibrium only if
Moreover, in this equilibrium the search engine operators choose maximal di¤ erentiation with s 2 = 1=2, both search engines place positive number of advertisement slots on their web pages, …rm 1 displays more advertisements and charges a higher price for its advertisement slots.
Proof. See Appendix.
In equilibrium it is optimal for the …rms to choose maximal di¤erentiation in order to reduce competition for users from each other. Proposition 1 shows that a situation in which two …rms are in the market with the superior …rm having a larger market share of users is an equilibrium only if the quality advantage of the superior …rm is not too large, but not too small either. If the quality advantage exceeds a certain upper threshold, search engine 1 would attract all the users although …rm 2 placed no advertisements in equilibrium. To understand the intuition behind this result it is instructive to consider the …rms'reaction functions a 1 (a 2 ) and a 2 (a 1 ) which give the optimal number of advertisements placed by …rm i in response to the advertisements placed by …rm j. The reaction functions of …rms 1 and 2 for s 2 = 1=2 are
a 2 (a 1 ) = max 0; (1 )(1 + 4( a 1 )) 4(1 + 2 (1 )) .
Note that the …rms'decisions about the amount of advertisements placed are strategic complements as @a 1 (a 2 )=@a 2 = =(1 + 2 ) > 0 and @a 2 (a 1 )=@a 1 = =(1 + 2 (1 ) > 0 hold. Since the superior …rm has a quality advantage, it can serve all the users and place advertisements even if its competitor does not advertise. This is not the case for the inferior …rm: the larger the superior …rm's quality advantage, the more likely it is that the inferior …rm does not advertise at all in equilibrium. Figure 1 represents two equilibria for the cases < and = . In one equilibrium given by point A when the quality advantage of the superior …rm is not too high (i.e.
< holds), both …rms display advertisements. In equilibrium B where the superior …rm has a relatively large quality advantage (i.e. = holds), the inferior …rm has no users and does not display advertisements. It follows from the …rms'…rst order conditions with respect to the number of advertisement slots that a …rm serving no users does not place any advertisements in equilibrium:
At the same time the quality advantage has a lower bound: it must be high enough for the superior search engine to have a larger share of users. The superior …rm exploits its quality advantage and displays in equilibrium more advertisements than the inferior …rm. In order to keep its dominant position, the superior …rm must have a quality advantage high enough to compensate the users for the disutility from showing more advertisements. Since the superior …rm has a larger user pool, it faces higher demand for advertisement slots in equilibrium, and can not only place more advertisements, but also charge higher price per slot, with 
where
It is left to note that the upper bound of the superior …rm's quality advantage ( ) depends solely on the users' disutility from more advertisements ( ). The upper bound is the quality advantage which makes all the users prefer the superior search engine when it advertises while the inferior search engine does not place any advertisements. However, the lower bound on the quality advantage depends also on the inferior …rm's handycap parameter ( ). The critical quality advantage of the superior …rm ( ) is larger if the inferior …rm's ability to match advertisements to queries is lower. With a lower ability to match ads to queries the inferior …rm places less advertisements in equilibrium. Thus, the superior search engine needs a higher quality advantage to attract the majority of the users.
In the next section we analyze the e¤ects of a cooperation agreement (ad-sharing agreement)
between the search engine operators.
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We assume that the cooperation increases the quality of the services provided by the inferior search engine. As it gains access to the technology of the superior …rm it becomes able to match advertisements with search queries better. This has two e¤ects: First, the inferior search engine can provide more relevant search results to its users. Second, better matched advertisements increase the probability of a successful sale by the advertisers of the inferior search engine.
We capture this formally by assuming that the ad-sharing agreement results in a simultaneous increase in parameter and a decrease in parameter .
We analyze the incentives of the search engines to enter into an ad-sharing agreement and examine the e¤ects of such an agreement on the advertisers'and consumers'surpluses. We start with analyzing the e¤ect of an increase in the demand for advertisement slots resulting from a decrease in parameter .
Proposition 2. Suppose < < . As the demand for advertisement slots of the inferior …rm rises (i.e. decreases), the following holds:
i) both search engines provide more advertisement slots, ii) the superior (inferior) search engine gains (loses) market share of users, iii) both search engines charge a higher price for the advertisement slots, iv) both search engines make larger pro…ts.
According to Proposition 2 both …rms increase the number of advertisements with the rise in the demand for advertisement slots at the inferior search engine. The inferior …rm displays more advertisements as it is directly a¤ected by the increase in demand. The superior …rm is a¤ected indirectly, and can increase the number of advertisement slots if the competitor does so.
It is instructive to inspect the reaction functions as given by Expression (6). With a decrease in parameter the superior …rm's reaction function remains unchanged while that of the inferior …rm shifts outward for a 2 > 0. Figure 2 illustrates the change in the equilibrium for two situations. In the …rst situation the reaction function of the inferior …rm a 2 (a 1 ) is a¤ected by the decrease in parameter in two ways: its slope increases and it shifts upwards (a 2 (a 1 )). The equilibrium point moves from F to G. In the second case, the reaction function of the inferior 13 …rm e a 2 (a 1 ) rotates around point C. 6 The equilibrium point shifts from D to E. Both cases result in a higher number of advertisements at both search engines.
The e¤ect of a change in parameter on the equilibrium It is the sum of two e¤ects that determines how the equilibrium number of advertising changes following a decrease in parameter . The direct e¤ ect originates from a change in demand for advertising slots at the inferior …rm and only the advertising decision of the inferior …rm is a¤ected by it. The strategic e¤ ect results from the observation that the …rms'decisions on the number of advertisement slots are strategic complements. If one …rm displays more advertisements, the other can do so as well. The two e¤ects can be disentangled using the …rms' reaction functions:
The inferior …rm is a¤ected directly by the increase in demand for its advertisement slots. As advertising space becomes more valuable on its homepage, it displays more advertisements. The advertisers'demand at the superior …rm remains unchanged, thus it is a¤ected only indirectly by the change in parameter , through the strategic e¤ect. The strategic e¤ect is at work at 6 The maximum number of advertisements the superior …rm can place to drive the inferior …rm out of the user market does not depend on .
14 the inferior search engine too and ampli…es the positive direct e¤ect. As a result, in the new equilibrium both search engines display more advertisements. Both search engines bene…t from the increased demand for advertising slots at the inferior …rm since they can both place more advertisements and charge a higher price per slot.
We now analyze the e¤ects of an increase in the users'utility from searching at the inferior …rm due to the ad-sharing agreement. Both …rms use a technology which matches advertisements with search queries. The superior …rm displays more relevant advertisements next to the search results. This technology now becomes available for the other …rm through the ad-sharing agreement resulting in an increase of parameter (i.e. decreases).
Proposition 3. As the inferior …rm provides higher utility from its services to users due to the increase of parameter :
i) the superior (inferior) search engine displays less (more) advertisements, ii) the superior (inferior) search engine loses (gains) market share of users, iii) the superior (inferior) …rm chargers a lower (higher) price for the advertisement slots, iv) the superior (inferior) …rm makes lower (higher) pro…ts, v) the e¤ ect on the joint pro…ts is negative.
Again, it is helpful to distinguish between a direct e¤ ect and a strategic e¤ ect of the change in the inferior …rm's technology parameter ( ) on the advertising decisions. These e¤ects can be represented as
The direct e¤ect is driven by the change in the quality advantage of the superior …rm. The strategic e¤ect is related to the complementarity of the …rms'advertising choices and captures 15 by how much one …rm changes its advertising level in response to a change by the other …rm.
In the case of an increase in parameter the direct and strategic e¤ects point into opposite directions at the two search engines. As the quality gap between the two …rms narrows the direct e¤ect is positive for the inferior …rm and negative for the superior one. The search quality at the inferior …rm increases with the cooperation, hence, it can place more advertisements in equilibrium without losing users. At the same time the superior …rm's quality advantage erodes and it has to reduce the number of advertisements to keep users from switching. The strategic e¤ect is negative for the inferior …rm: In equilibrium the superior …rm decreases its advertising level, hence, the strategic response of the inferior …rm is to show less advertisements too. For the superior …rm it is the other way around: since the inferior …rm shows more advertisements in the new equilibrium, it displays more advertisements. The direct e¤ect is stronger than the strategic e¤ect, and the inferior …rm increases while the superior …rm decreases the number of advertisement slots in the new equilibrium. As the utility from search increases at …rm 2, it is able to attract users from …rm 1 despite increasing the number of advertisements. At the same time the inferior …rm charges a higher price per slot than before and makes higher pro…ts. The reason for this is that equilibrium prices move in the same direction as advertising levels when remains unchanged, as can be seen from Expression (8). For the superior …rm it means that showing less advertisements results in lower per slot prices, hence its pro…t decreases.
Having derived the e¤ects of the cooperation on the …rms' pro…ts in Propositions 2 and 3, we can address the question of the superior search engine operator's incentive to improve its inferior competitor by providing access to its higher quality search technology. While the inferior search engine surely bene…ts from the cooperation, it is not necessarily the case for the superior search engine. On the one hand, the superior …rm bene…ts as demand for advertisement slots at its competitor increases. With advertising decisions being strategic complements, more advertisements displayed by the competitor means more advertisements and higher pro…ts for the superior …rm. On the other hand, the superior …rm loses with the inferior …rm providing higher search quality to users. As the superior …rm's quality advantage erodes, some users switch to the competitor, making the superior search engine less attractive for advertisers. Whether the superior search engine has an incentive to share its technology with the competitor thus depends on which of the two e¤ects is stronger. If the cooperation results in a relatively high increase in demand for advertising space for the competing …rm and a relatively low improvement of the competitor's search quality vis-à-vis users, the superior …rm is interested in the cooperation. If the opposite is the case it will refrain from sharing its technology with the other …rm.
Corollary 1. If the superior search engine operator decides to enter the cooperation agreement, then its share of users increases, it places more advertisements and charges a higher price for its advertisement slots compared to the equilibrium before the cooperation. Although the superior search engine's share of users increases, the inferior …rm bene…ts from the cooperation.
Proof. The superior search engine enters the agreement only if its pro…t ( 1 ) increases. It follows from Expression (8) that the equilibrium slot price (p 1 ) and advertising quantity (a 1 ) at the superior search engine move in the same direction following a change in parameters and
. Thus the pro…t of the superior search engine can increase only if both a 1 and p 1 increase.
Moreover, it follows from Expression (7) that the equilibrium share of users of …rm 1 (n 1 ) also moves together with a 1 . It was shown in Propositions 2 and 3 that the inferior …rm always bene…ts from the cooperation. Q.E.D.
Our analysis shows that if the cooperation takes place, it further strengthens the dominant position of the superior …rm in the user market. This result supports the concerns of competition authorities about the planned ad-sharing cooperation between Yahoo and Google. In the next section we illustrate the condition for the superior …rm to enter the cooperation agreement for a numerical speci…cation.
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Firm 1 enters the agreement if it leads to a higher pro…t. The change in its pro…t can be approximated in the following way:
, where 1 , and denote the changes in the superior …rm's equilibrium pro…t, the inferior …rm's sale probability and the quality of its search result, respectively. We introduce a parameter with = j = j, which measures the ratio of the change in to the change in as a result of the cooperation.
Parameter is higher if the agreement results in a relatively high improvement of the inferior …rm's search quality and a relatively low increase in demand for its advertising space. The lower the value of parameter , the more attractive is the cooperation for the superior …rm. Figure   3 illustrates the critical initial values of and for …rm 1 to enter the agreement for di¤erent levels of . We use = 1 and q = 1=2 for the example. Consider …rst initial levels of and given by point H: In this case the superior …rm would have an incentive to enter the agreement if the resulting magnitude of decrease in was more than ten times higher than the increase in parameter , that is if < 0:1. If the initial parameters were given by point I, the superior …rm would not enter the agreement if it led to the same change in and . We next analyze the welfare e¤ects of the ad-sharing agreement and consider the e¤ects on the advertisers'and users'surpluses.
Welfare Analysis
We start with the advertisers' surplus. For the linear demand for advertisement slots this is de…ned as
We now turn to the users' surplus. From Expression (4) we get that t 1 (a 1 ; a 2 ; s 2 ) = 1 t 2 (a 1 ; a 2 ; s 2 ), hence in equilibrium the marginal users are located symmetrically on the circle.
From Expression (3) we get the users'surplus as
The e¤ects of the cooperation on the users'and advertisers'surpluses are summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The agreement allowing the superior …rm to share its technology with its competitor has two contrary e¤ ects on the users' and advertisers' surpluses: i) as the demand for the advertisement slots of the inferior …rm rises with the decrease in parameter users' (advertisers') surplus decreases (increases),
ii) as the inferior …rm provides higher utility from its services to users due to the increase of parameter users' (advertisers') surplus increases (decreases).
As the inferior search engine becomes able to match more relevant advertisements to search keywords, the advertisers'demand for advertisement slots increases. Both search engines show more advertisements in the new equilibrium which a¤ects the utility of every user negatively.
At the same time the advertisers'surplus increases due to the higher willingness to pay for an advertisement slot. With the better matching technology, the inferior search engine provides 19 higher utility to users. Since the improved quality attracts some users to the inferior search engine it can increase the number of advertisements without losing market share. This puts pressure on the superior search engine to display less advertisements in order to keep its users.
Overall, the disutility of the users conducting search at the inferior search engine due to being exposed to more advertisements is outweighed by the positive e¤ects of the quality improvement:
they bene…t from the increased relevance of the advertisements and the users searching at the superior search engine gain higher utility as they are shown less advertisements. Summing up Propositions 2, 3 and 4 we can conclude that the incentives of the superior search engine's operator to share its technology with its competitor are aligned with the advertisers' and are contrary to the users' interests. If the cooperation takes place it is likely to have a negative e¤ect on the users'surplus and to bene…t advertisers.
Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed cooperation in advertising between internet search engines and considered an agreement where one …rm shares its more advanced technology with its competitor.
The …rst question we addressed was whether the …rms have incentives to participate in such an arrangement. We identi…ed the conditions under which a superior …rm is interested in improving the quality of the services provided by its inferior competitor. Whether the superior …rm has an incentive to enter into such an arrangement depends on the relative strength of two di¤erent e¤ects. The …rst e¤ect results in an increase in the demand for advertisement slots at the inferior …rm which leads to an increase of pro…t for the superior …rm. Since advertising decisions are strategic complements the superior search engine bene…ts from the increased number of advertisement slots placed at the inferior search engine. The second e¤ect results in an increase in the users' utility from searching at the inferior …rm. As the inferior search engine becomes more attractive for users the pro…t of the superior …rm decreases. Whether the superior search engine has an incentive to enter into such an agreement depends on which of the two e¤ects will be stronger as a result of the cooperation. Although the superior …rm gains market share the inferior …rm bene…ts from the agreement: the increase in the value of the later's advertising slots o¤sets its pro…t loss due to the decreased market share.
We also analyzed the welfare implications of the agreement and found that these two e¤ects 20 work in opposite directions for the advertisers'and users'surpluses. However, the superior …rm's decision to enter the agreement is likely to be in line with the advertisers'and contrary to the users'interests.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. We start with the location choice of …rm 2. The …rst order condition of …rm 2 with respect to s 2 is
which is zero if either s 2 = 1=2 or = (a 1 a 2 ) holds. It follows from Expression (5) that with = (a 1 a 2 ) the …rms have equal market shares which we rule out per assumption. In the following we consider s 2 = 1=2. Solving the …rst order conditions of …rms 1 and 2 with respect to a 1 and a 2 simultaneously yields a 1 (s 2 ) and a 2 (s 2 ). By plugging in s 2 = 1=2 we get
The values s 2 = 1=2, a 1 and a 2 constitute an equilibrium in which n 1 > n 2 > 0 if the corresponding second order conditions are ful…lled, all equilibrium values are positive and n 1 (s 2 ; a 1 ; a 2 ) > n 2 (s 2 ; a 1 ; a 2 ) > 0 holds. The second order conditions with respect to a 1 and a 2 are ful…lled as
is always true. The second order condition with respect to s 2 at the point s 2 , a 1 and a 2 is given by
We introduce a function ( ) = ( )( ) such that sign @ 2 2 (s 2 ; a 1 ; a 2 )=@(s 2 ) 2 = sign [ ( )]. The function ( ) has two roots 1 = and 2 = and is strictly positive 21 for < < . Hence, for < < it holds that @ 2 2 (s 2 ; a 1 ; a 2 )=@(s 2 ) 2 < 0. Using the equilibrium values s 2 , a 1 and a 2 we calculate p i (s 2 ; a 1 ; a 2 ) and n i (s 2 ; a 1 ; a 2 ).
Claim 1. Under the condition < it holds that a 1 > a 2 , p 1 > p 2 and n 1 > n 2 .
Proof. To compare the values we build the following di¤erences:
a 1 a 2 = + 4 (2 (1 ) + 2 ) 4(3 2 (1 ) + 2 (2 ) + 1) ,
and
which are positive for > . This completes the proof of the claim.
Claim 2. Under the condition < it holds that a i , p i ,n i > 0.
Proof. With < it follows from Expression (11) that a 2 > 0. The equilibrium price of the second …rm p 2 is
which is positive for < . From Expression (2) we get that n 2 = (p 2 + a 2 )=(1 ) > 0 if p 2 ; a 2 > 0. In Claim 1 we showed that a 1 > a 2 , p 1 > p 2 and n 1 > n 2 , hence, it also holds that a 1 ; p 1 ; n 1 > 0 if < . This completes the proof of the claim.
We showed that if < < , then a i , p i , n i and s constitute an equilibrium in which
Proof of Proposition 2. Under the maintained assumption < < we know from Proposition 1 that in equilibrium …rms choose maximal di¤erentiation from each other. In the following we proceed with s 2 = 1=2.
i) We start with the e¤ect of a change in on the number of advertisements displayed, a i .
Taking the derivative of Expression (11) with respect to we get
Both derivatives are negative for < . Thus, if the demand for advertisement slots of the inferior …rm rises due to a decrease in both …rms show more advertisements.
ii) We proceed with the e¤ect of on the market shares n i (a i ( ); a j ( )) by inspecting the expression @n i (a i ( ); a j ( ))=@ for i 6 = j:
It follows from (5) that @n i =@a j > 0 and @n i =@a i = @n i =@a j for i 6 = j. Hence, by rearranging
Expression (13) we get
Note that @n 1 =@ = @n 2 =@ . We evaluate the sign of the derivative @(a 2 a 1 )=@ by subtracting Expression (12a) from Expression (12b) to get
which is negative for < . Hence, @n 1 (a 1 ( ); a 2 ( ))=@ < 0 and @n 2 (a 1 ( ); a 2 ( ))=@ > 0.
iii) Next, we turn to the e¤ect of change in on the prices of advertisement slots. We inspect @p 1 (n 1 (a 1 ( ); a 2 ( )); a 1 ( ))=@ and @p 2 (n 2 (a 1 ( ); a 2 ( )); a 2 ( ); )=@ . We use Expression (14) to rearrange these derivatives:
Taking the derivatives of Expressions (5) with respect to a 1 and a 2 yields @n i =@a j = =(2s 2 (1 s 2 )). With s 2 = 1=2 we arrive at
We can now plug Expressions (17), (15) and (12a) into Expression (16a) to get
which is negative for < . We next plug Expressions (17), (15), (12b) and n 2 into Expression (16b) to get
This expression is negative for < .
iv) Finally, to analyze the in ‡uence of a change in on the …rms' pro…ts we inspect the
We know from i) and iii) that the derivatives @p i =@ and @a i =@ are negative, hence, @ i =@ < 0. With a decrease of parameter , the pro…ts of both …rms increase. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. Under the maintained assumption < < we know from Proposition 1 that in equilibrium …rms choose maximal di¤erentiation from each other. In the following we proceed with s 2 = 1=2.
i) We start with the e¤ect of a change in on the number of advertisements displayed by taking the derivatives of a 1 and a 2 with respect to . The signs of the expressions @a 1 =@ and @a 2 =@ are straightforward:
Hence, the superior (inferior) …rm displays less (more) advertisements with an increase in .
ii) Turning to the e¤ect of on the market shares n i , we inspect the derivative dn i (a 1 ( ); a 2 ( ); )=d .
Using that @n i =@a i = @n i =@a j for i 6 = j we get
Since the user market is always covered, it holds that dn 1 =d = dn 2 =d . Hence, we will only analyze the sign of the derivative dn 1 =d . From Expression (18) we compute the di¤erence
We now turn to the derivative @n 1 =@ . Taking the derivative of Expression (5) with respect to we get @n 1 =@ = q=2s 2 (1 s 2 ). Given the equilibrium location s 2 = 1=2 we arrive at
Plugging Expressions (17), (20) and (21) into Expression (19) we get
Hence, @n 1 =@ < 0 and @n 2 =@ > 0.
iii) We now turn to the e¤ect of an increase in on the …rms'prices. The derivatives of the equilibrium prices with respect to are given by dp 1 (n 1 (a 1 ( ); a 2 ( ))
Remember that dn 1 =d = dn 2 =d . Using Expressions (18) and (22) we get dp 1 ( )
With an increase in parameter the superior (inferior) …rm chargers a lower (higher) price for the advertisement slots.
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Using Inequalities (18) and (23) we get that @ 1 =@ < 0 and @ 2 =@ > 0. With an increase in parameter the superior (inferior) …rm makes lower (higher) pro…ts.
v) The total e¤ect of a change in on the …rms'joint pro…t is negative if j@ 1 =@ j > j@ 2 =@ j, which is equivalent to
Since a 1 > a 2 and p 1 > p 2 , Inequality (24) holds if j@p 1 =@ j > j@p 2 =@ j and j@a 1 =@ j > j@a 2 =@ j.
Comparing the expressions we get that
which implies that j@ 1 =@ j > j@ 2 =@ j. The e¤ect of an increase in on the …rms'joint pro…ts is negative. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. i)
We …rst analyze the in ‡uence of the change in parameters on the advertisers' surplus. We see from Expression (9) that AS(a 1 ; a 2 ) increases in both a 1 and a 2 .
In Proposition 2 we showed that with a decrease in both a 1 and a 2 increase. It follows that AS(a 1 ; a 2 ) increases as the demand for the advertisement slots of the inferior …rm rises. To show the e¤ect of parameter on the advertisers' surplus we …rst take the derivative of Expression (9) with respect to : @AS(a 1 ( ); a 2 ( )) @ = a 1 @a 1 @ + a 2 @a 2 @ .
We know from Proposition 3 that @a 1 =@ < 0 and @a 2 =@ > 0. Moreover, from Expression (25) we have that j@a 1 =@ j > j@a 2 =@ j. As stated in Proposition 1, a 1 (s 2 ) > a 2 (s 2 ). It follows, that AS decreases as parameter increases.
ii) We now turn to the analysis of the users'surplus. It is useful to distinguish between two groups of users: those who do not switch from the original engine in response to a change in parameters or , and those who do. We will refer to the former group of users as switchers and to the latter as non-switchers. We start with the e¤ect of a change in on the switchers'utility.
Let t 1 and t 2 denote the locations of the marginal users and U i the user's utility after a change in parameter . We showed in Proposition 2 that n 1 increases in response to a reduction in , hence t 1 > t 1 and t 2 < t 2 . Since marginal users are symmetric, we can restrict our analysis to the switchers with locations t 2 [t 1 ; t 1 ]. Before the change in parameter the switchers preferred search engine 2, hence for t 2 [t 1 ; t 1 ] it holds that U 1 (t) < U 2 (t). We also know from Proposition 2 that a 1 increases with a decrease in , hence U 1 (t) < U 1 (t) for any t 2 [t 1 ; t 1 ]. Combining the two inequalities we get U 1 (t) < U 1 (t) < U 2 (t), hence the utility of the switchers decreases due to a decrease in .
We now turn to the e¤ect of a change in on the non-switchers' utility. From Equation (3) we can distinguish three components of a user's utility: search quality ( i q), disutility from advertisements ( a i ) and transportation costs ( 2 i ). For non-switchers only the disutility from advertisements is a¤ected by a change in . We showed in Proposition 2 that both a 1 and a 2 increase with a decrease in which results in a reduction in utility of non-switchers. We can conclude then that both switchers and non-switchers are worse-o¤ due to the decrease in parameter .
We now consider the e¤ect of an increase in parameter on the switchers' utility. Let t 1 and t 2 denote the locations of the marginal users and U i the utility of a user after a change in parameter . We showed in Proposition 3 that n 1 decreases in response to an increase in parameter , hence t 1 < t 1 and t 2 > t 2 . Since marginal users are symmetric, we can restrict our analysis to the switchers with the locations t 2 [t 1 ; t 1 ]. After the change in parameter switchers prefer search engine 2, hence for t 2 [t 1 ; t 1 ] it holds that U 2 (t) > U 1 (t). We also know from Proposition 3 that a 1 decreases with an increase in , hence U 1 (t) > U 1 (t) must hold for any t 2 [t 1 ; t 1 ]. Combining the two inequalities we get U 2 (t) > U 1 (t) > U 1 (t), hence the utility of the switchers increases due to an increase in parameter .
We …nally turn to the e¤ect of a change in on the non-switchers'utility. As the marginal users are symmetric we restrict our analysis to the users with the locations t 2 [0; 1=2]. We know from Proposition 3 that a 1 decreases and a 2 increases in response to an increase in . Moreover, we know that j@a 1 =@ j > j@a 2 =@ j, hence every non-switcher who searches at engine 1 (with location t 2 [0; t 1 ]) bene…ts more from an increase in than any non-switcher who searches at engine 2 (with location t 2 [t 1 ; 1=2]) loses. We also know that n 1 > n 2 for any , hence using the symmetry of the marginal consumers and the fact that t 1 < t 1 we can conclude that t 1 > 1=2 t 1 > 1=2 t 1 . It follows that the number of non-switchers who search at the engine 1 given by 2t 1 is larger than the number of non-switchers who search at the engine 2 given by 2(1=2 t 1 ). The positive e¤ect of the decrease in the number of advertisements placed at engine 1 is stronger than the negative e¤ect due to the increase in the number of advertisements placed at engine 2 and non-switchers bene…t from the increase in parameter . Combining this result with the in ‡uence on the switchers'utility we conclude that the users'surplus increases in response to an increase in parameter . Q.E.D.
